The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History

Product Information

The Russo-Ukrainian war, Plokhy argues, marks the end of the unipolar world that had come into being after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin had hoped for multipolarity, with several great powers asserting their spheres of influence. However, what the historian sees emerging instead is a new confrontation between East and West. The author is a historian not a political scientist so his ignoring the influence of Dugin is understandable. Before my first reporting trip to Ukraine, one of my seasoned war correspondent colleagues had two pieces of advice. First, not to miss the delicious coffee and pastries you can find in Kyiv (which is a wonderfully reassuring thing to hear as you head off towards a conflict). Second, that it was absolutely necessary to read Serhii Plokhy’s 2015 book The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine. I did, and it unwound 2,500 years of complex, fascinating and often tragic events, all the way from Herodotus’s accounts of the ancient Scythians to the Maidan protests in Kyiv a decade ago. Now Plokhy and I are speaking by Zoom – me from London, he from his home near Harvard, where he is professor of Ukrainian history. He’s in his study. There are globes on every surface, and antique maps of Ukraine hang on the walls. This book is in two halves, before 22 February 2022 and after. I needed the first part (but not the second) because after all the millions of words spouted forth by the journalists and professors, still my brain could not quite grasp exactly why Putin decided to roll his tanks.

In Plokhy’s summary, “Ukraine was divided by history, culture, and the political orientations and instincts of its people as the Russian Federation never was.” Those who imagine a modern democratic nation in 19th-century terms – as a culturally, linguistically and politically united entity – stress all these factors as sources of instability. Serhii Plokhy oferă o privire cuprinzătoare asupra contextului istoric și a primelor luni ale războiului în curs de desfășurare din Ucraina. Urmărind secole de relații turbulente între Rusia și Ucraina, Plokhy susține că acest conflict a fost pregătit de zeci de ani, alimentat de ambițiile imperiale ale lui Putin și de lunga luptă a Ucrainei pentru suveranitate (și păstrarea identității sale). Den andra halvan beskriver bara övergripande hur kriget har utkämpats fram till manusslutet i februari. Hans fokus är här fortfarande den politiska och ekonomiska sidan snarare än den militära. Även här är det välskrivet och informativt. Om det är något som saknas är det möjligen att han inte förklarar den enorma påverkan som de ortodoxa kyrkorna och deras strider haft som bidragit på olika sätt till konflikten.

Well a barrier is one thing, but a springboard is a whole other thing. Putin might not mind a barrier but when the Ukrainian constitution was changed on 7 February 2019 to include the strategic objectives of joining the EU and NATO, then for Putin the barrier was now very clearly becoming a springboard. An illuminating account of the war in Ukraine - its historical roots, its course, its possible outcomes - from the bestselling, award-winning author of Chernobyl P.S. Vă las și un citat despre o vizită la Kiev. Sunt curioasă dacă observați ce personaj este pierdut din poveste. Și nu cred că din răutate:( Historians, used to slow-burning research projects, have so far been absent from this developing historiography of the war. This is beginning to change, and it is only appropriate that the lead is taken by one of the most accomplished English-language historians of Ukraine, Harvard University’s Serhii Plokhy. Readers aiming to follow the fighting should read the daily news, but for a complete picture, this is the book.

The Russo-Ukrainian War stelt niet teleur. Plokhy toont zich betrokken zonder zijn professionele standaard als historicus te verlagen. Het is een verhelderende uiteenzetting die boven alles duidelijk maakt dat de Russische aanval op Oekraïne van februari 2022 eigenlijk al zo’n drie decennia in de lucht hing. Luke Harding’s Invasion: Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival is published by Guardian Faber Tegen deze achtergrond bestond er vanaf het einde van de Koude Oorlog eigenlijk voortdurend onzekerheid over de vraag of Rusland de territoriale integriteit van Oekraïne zou blijven respecteren. Al in 1992 nam het Russische parlement een resolutie aan die de Krim als onderdeel van Rusland beschouwde. Duidelijk is dat Oekraïense soevereiniteit slechts was gegarandeerd zolang het land zich schikte naar de belangen van Rusland, of zoals Plokhy schrijft: “Russia’s recognition of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the post-Soviet states would be conditional on alliance with Moscow.” (66) Onder deze omstandigheden, zo bepleitte John Mearsheimer in 1993 in Foreign Affairs, zouden de VS er goed aan doen Oekraïne toe te staan te blijven beschikken over kernwapens; volgens de Amerikaanse strateeg was dit “the most effective way to prevent a Russo-Ukrainian war [which could] ‘injure the prospects for peace throughout Europe.’” (71-2)

But there were domestic forces too. They encouraged Ukraine’s recurrent democratic corrections, whenever one strongman or another tried to move the country towards autocracy. Here, Plokhy turns perceived wisdom on its head.

His latest title, The Russo-Ukrainian War, is in a similar elegant vein. It is deeply personal, too. On the morning of the invasion he phoned his sister in Zaporizhzhia, where there were explosions. A friend sent a photo of a soldier reading one of Plokhy’s books in a trench; days later, the young man was killed. The historian’s cousin Andriy Kholopov died fighting in Bakhmut, a scene of terrible slaughter. A friend sent a photo of a soldier reading one of Plokhy’s books in a trench; days later, the young man was killed For historians, he’s concluded, “It’s important not to always wait until things are over before you speak.” The past makes the present legible, even as events keep tumbling rapidly, messily, relentlessly forward.At the time of Ukrainian entry to the USSR, Crimea was included in the Ukraine SSR, leading one to think that Crimea would share Ukraine's status after the 1992 referendum on independence. That was the case – until Putin's 2014 annexation of Crimea by force. US supplies of sophisticated weapons such as long-range artillery systems have driven Ukraine’s counter-offensive. Putin has long railed against American hegemony and called for a “multipolar” world. Plokhy believes the war has taken us into a new age of superpower rivalry. Its poles, however, are Washington and Beijing. Moscow is China’s weaker and poorer partner. Plokhy is the foremost chronicler of early and modern Ukraine and the author of numerous books. They include The Gates of Europe, Lost Kingdom, The Man With the Poison Gun and Chernobyl, a compelling account of the 1986 nuclear disaster, which won the 2018 Baillie Gifford prize. His work is rigorous and objective, and also wonderfully readable and lucid.

Intelligence failure’ of ‘error of judgment’? Of allebei? Poetin had in ieder geval beter kunnen weten als hij had geluisterd naar kolonel-generaal b.d. Leonid Ivashov, die hem als voorzitter van de Russische officieren vereniging in januari 2021, enkele weken vóór de inval, een open brief schreef: “The use of military force against Ukraine will, in the first place, put into question the existence of Russia itself as a state. Secondly, it will make Russians and Ukrainians mortal enemies for ever. Thirdly, thousands (tens of thousands) of healthy young men will perish on both sides, and that will unquestionably affect the future demographic situation in our countries, which are dying out.” (149) A harrowing expedition to Antarctica, recounted by Departures senior features editor Sancton, who has reported from every continent on the planet. Plokhy prefers “Russo-Ukrainian war” to alternatives like “ Russia’s war against Ukraine”. While the latter expression is well suited to emphasising Russia’s culpability in this war, the former stresses that Ukraine is not just a victim of Russia, but its equal. Over a year into Russia’s grotesque full-scale invasion of Ukraine, disinformation and misconceptions of the conflict — fuelled both by the Kremlin and by political actors abroad — continue to permeate public debate. "The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History" by Serhii Plokhy takes aim at many of these myths, demonstrating how Russia’s centuries-long imperial obsession with Ukraine created the conditions for Europe’s largest land war since 1945.The book focuses on Russian and Ukrainian developments following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It highlights Russian persistance in weakening Ukraine whilst recognising it as the most important element of any imperial revival, be it the Tsarist Empire or Soviet Empires (whose flags have been raised in St Petersberg last month), or as a commonwealth, as envisioned by Yeltsin. Anders dan in Rusland wist het parlement in Oekraïne met vallen en opstaan wél een sterke positie te verwerven tegenover de uitvoerende macht. De vreedzame machtswisseling na de presidentsverkiezingen van 1994, van Leonid Kravtsjoek naar Leonid Kuchma, was een belangrijke eerste mijlpaal in de democratische ontwikkeling van de voormalige sovjetrepubliek. Voor de goede orde: Kuchma bleek als president allesbehalve een voorbeeldige democraat. Net als Jeltsin in Moskou, probeerde hij de grondwet naar zijn hand te zetten. Anders dan Jeltsin, slaagde hij daarin echter niet. Tien jaar later, in 2004, lukte het Kuchma evenmin om Viktor Janoekovitsj, de corrupte pro-Russische gouverneur van Donetsk, tot zijn opvolger te benoemen. Hoe corrupt en verdeeld Oekraïne ook was, de meeste Oekraïners eisten democratie en velen bleken bereid hiervoor hun nek uit te steken tijdens de eerste Maidan-protesten na de gemanipuleerde verkiezingen van 2004. Rusland raakte langzaam maar zeker de greep op Oekraïne steeds meer kwijt.