Killing Rommel: An action-packed, tense and thrilling wartime adventure guaranteed to keep you on the edge of your seat

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Butler, Daniel Allen (2015). Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel. Havertown, PA / Oxford: Casemate. ISBN 978-1-61200-297-2. Johannes Erwin Eugen Rommel ( pronounced [ˈɛʁviːn ˈʁɔməl] ⓘ; 15 November 1891– 14 October 1944) was a German Generalfeldmarschall ( field marshal) during World War II. Popularly known as the Desert Fox ( German: Wüstenfuchs, pronounced [ˈvyːstn̩ˌfʊks] ⓘ), he served in the Wehrmacht (armed forces) of Nazi Germany, as well as serving in the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic, and the army of Imperial Germany. Rommel was injured multiple times in both world wars. Naumann, Klaus (2009). "Afterword". In Charles Messenger (ed.). Rommel: Leadership Lessons from the Desert Fox. Basingstoke, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-60908-2. Myth of 'humane' Nazi Erwin Rommel debunked: 2008 The Daily Telegraph news report on "The Rommel Myth" exhibition. Images from the exhibition as they appeared in the book In Detail, Exhibitions and Displays. Kubetzky, Thomas (2010). "The mask of command": Bernard L. Montgomery, George S. Patton und Erwin Rommell. LIT Verlag Münster. ISBN 978-3-643-10349-9.

Operation Flipper - Wikipedia

Hitler met with Rommel and Kesselring to discuss future operations in Italy on 30 September 1943. Rommel insisted on a defensive line north of Rome, while Kesselring was more optimistic and advocated holding a line south of Rome. Hitler preferred Kesselring's recommendation, and therefore revoked his previous decision for the subordination of Kesselring's forces to Rommel's army group. On 19 October, Hitler decided that Kesselring would be the overall commander of the forces in Italy, sidelining Rommel. [214]

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Hecht, Cornelia; Häußler, Johannes; Linder, Rainer, eds. (2008). Mythos Rommel. Stuttgart: Haus der Geschichte Baden-Württemberg. ISBN 978-3-933726-28-5. Martin Kitchen: "Early biographies, such as that by Desmond Young, were positively adulatory." [18] Augstein, Franziska (17 May 2010). "Offizier mit Leib und Ledermantel". Süddeutsche Zeitung. Archived from the original on 11 December 2016. The Cairns Post (9 September 1941). "Gangster goes to war? Hitler's "white hope" ". The Cairns Post . Retrieved 14 September 2017. Very different, however, was the perception of Rommel by Italian common soldiers and NCOs, who, like the German field troops, had the deepest trust and respect for him. [371] [N 8] Paolo Colacicchi, an officer in the Italian Tenth Army recalled that Rommel "became sort of a myth to the Italian soldiers". [372] Rommel himself held a much more generous view about the Italian soldier [373] than about their leadership, towards whom his disdain, deeply rooted in militarism, was not atypical, although unlike Kesselring he was incapable of concealing it. [374] Unlike many of his superiors and subordinates who held racist views, he was usually "kindly disposed" to the Italians in general. [375]

Killing Rommel - Historical Novel Society

Claus Telp comments that Airaines was not in the sector of the 7th, but at Hangest and Martainville, elements of the 7th might have shot some prisoners and used British Colonel Broomhall as a human shield (although Telp is of the opinion that it was unlikely that Rommel approved of, or even knew about, these two incidents). [514]After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, it became clear to the Americans and the British that a German army would have to be revived to help face off against the Soviet Union. Many former German officers, including Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel, who had served on Rommel's staff in France, were convinced that no future West German Army would be possible without the rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht. In October 1950, at the behest of West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a group of former senior officers produced the document that later became known as the Himmerod memorandum. Intended as both a planning and a negotiating tool, the document included a key demand for "measures to transform domestic and foreign public opinion" with regards to the German military. [49] [50] Foundational works [ edit ] Brighton, Terry (2009). Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War. Crown/Archetype. ISBN 978-1-4001-1497-9. Rommel's grave is located in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm. For decades after the war on the anniversary of his death, veterans of the Africa campaign, including former opponents, would gather at his tomb in Herrlingen. [323] Style as military commander [ edit ] John Pimlott writes that Rommel was an impressive military commander who richly deserved his reputation as a leading exponent of mobile warfare, hampered by factors he could not control, although he usually accepted high risks and could become frustrated when forced on the defensive. On the other hand, Pimlott criticises Rommel for only disagreeing with Hitler for strategic reasons and, while accepting that Rommel did give chivalrous tone to his battles in Africa, he points out that this should not be used to ignore the responsibility Rommel must bear for promoting the Nazi cause with vigour. [193] The same sentiment is held by Williamson Murray and Alan Millett who opine that Rommel, contrary to allegations that he was only a competent tactical commander, was the most outstanding battlefield commander of the war, who showed a realistic strategic view despite holding minimal control over strategy. They point out that, "like virtually the entire German officer corps", he was a convinced Nazi. [194] While some, like Scianna, are more critical towards his strategical decisions but also dismiss negative myths such as Rommel's abandonment of his allies. [195] Krause, Michael D.; Phillips, R. Cody (2006). Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art. Government Printing Office. ISBN 978-0-16-072564-7.