The Making of the Modern Middle East: A Personal History

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In describing this action, Oren notes the tendency of the Egyptians and Jordanians to delude themselves as to the war’s progress. They told their people they were winning, and winning big, instead of being honest with themselves and suing for peace. This proved to be a costly bit of self-deception. Their hopes that the Soviets would intercede also turned out to be misplaced. Despite Soviet posturing, the Kremlin did not relish potentially sparking a third world war. Describing the buildup of tensions that preceded the war, and the at times bizarre events, he tells of the Egyptian press going big with a story about an Arab Legion defector named Capt. Rashid al-Hamarsha, who allegedly confessed to "masterminding subversion" in Syria. Ignorance Can be the greatest ally or the greatest enemy of an army at war. In the book Six Days of War, Michael B. Oren explains in considerable detail how Arab ignorance and mistrust was the real key to the vastly outnumbered Israelis defeating three Arab armies in just six days. Area “A” was to be under French influence and control, while “B” was to be under British influence and control. The Sykes-Picot Agreement also proposed an “international administration” for Palestine. The tone is very matter-of-fact which, while not exactly riveting, is information-dense and informative.

The Making of the Modern Middle East - Pan Macmillan The Making of the Modern Middle East - Pan Macmillan

The reasons are complicated, but Oren makes a strong case that Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer, supreme commander of Egyptian forces, filled the upper ranks of the Egyptian military with cronies, shoving aside talented leaders preparing for a coup against his childhood friend President Gamel Abdel Nasser. It is hardly suprising that a book such as this has been written by an admirer of Ariel Sharon, who went on to become Israels ambassador in Washington; what is a little surprising is the wide spread acclaim for this book by people who ought to know better. Poe, Marshall (11 May 2014). "Barry Rubin and Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East" (Yale UP, 2014)". New Books Network . Retrieved 14 May 2020. This is a very interesting book about Israel-Arab war. Because our generation witnessed this war and not looking at it only in retrospect it is especially interesting for me. I still clearly remember all propaganda Soviets conducted at that time... I remeber wwhat was written at that time in Soviet newspapers and what was broadcasted... Israel won that war, and later outfought Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956, though Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the canal made him immensely popular in the Arab World. As a result of the Crisis, the Sinai was demilitarized and United Nations observers put in place. Meanwhile, Nasser set out to modernize his army, and to form a coalition with King Hussein of Jordan, and Nureddin al-Atassi of Syria.The line across a map of the Middle East it drew created colonial spheres of influence that cut directly and artificially across a region that had previously been divided along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. The authors argue that there is a high degree of similarity in the ideologies of Nazism, radical Arab nationalism, and Islamism, an argument first made by the mufti. [2] [1] One of the most striking similarities, according to the authors, is that all three ideologies promote extreme antisemitism and blame Jews for all the problems in the world. [1] The Uneven Age of Speed: Caravans, Technology, and Mobility in the Late Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Middle East.

Six days of war by Michael B. Oren | Open Library Six days of war by Michael B. Oren | Open Library

In addition, Oren has consulted a wide variety of sources, from all the participant countries. To underscore this point, he even includes a photo of himself chatting with Jordanian Brigadier Ata Ali Haza’a.The Ottoman defeat in the First World War, however, shattered the visions of imperial reconstruction long cultivated by this last Ottoman generation. The victors of the war, namely Britain and France, had made plans to partition the Ottoman territories, but it proved to be a rather complicated business to reconcile a variety of promises they had made to different parties and reach a post-war settlement. In chapter two, Provence details these negotiations and the imposition of the mandate framework onto the region, showing how the Ottoman educated elite responded by appropriating Lenin and Wilson’s language of self-determination to advance their own agendas. As Provence skilfully shows, however, what proved more effective in challenging the dictated terms of the post-war settlement was armed resistance: locally rooted but led by the war-hardened ex-Ottoman officers. In this sense, the successful Kemalist struggle against the partitions in Asia Minor became a source of inspiration for the Ottoman-Arab officers operating in Mesopotamia and Greater Syria (i.e. today’s Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, and Jordan). Due to strategic calculations, the Kemalists were also willing to help their former classmates or ‘brotherly officers’, as Provence calls them, to wage a similar struggle against Britain and France. While both imperial powers struggled greatly to establish control in Greater Syria due to a series of uprisings that featured these itinerant ex-Ottoman veterans, they managed to contain all the insurgencies, except the one led by Mustafa Kemal. The war opened with the Israeli Air Force annihilating the Egyptian Air Force in a massively successful first strike. From this point, Oren devotes a chapter to each day of the war, balancing tactical descriptions with diplomacy and politics. For all sides, there was an emphasis on gaining as much territory before the UN imposed a ceasefire. Bowen’s The Making of the Modern Middle East is based on his own 30 years’ reporting of the Middle East. He looks at the region’s history, meets ordinary men and women on the front line and their leaders, and explores the power games that have wreaked devastation on civilian populations. And he assesses what the future might hold for the region. Initially, Israel wished to confine its actions to Egypt, even giving King Hussein the opportunity to stay on the sidelines. Hussein did not, however, which allowed Israel to capture the West Bank, including the entirety of Jerusalem. Ultimately, using Syrian shelling as a casus belli, Israel took the Golan as well. Provence’s Last Ottoman Generation is a solid work of scholarship, with an exemplary reinterpretation of the history of inter-war Middle East. Unfortunately, the book came out at a time that did not allow it to draw from more recent research. For a fuller view of the period, Provence’s work should be read side by side with Amit Bein’s study of Turkey in the interwar era, Benjamin Fortna’s biography of Eşref the Circassian, and Alp Yenen’s work on the Young Turks after 1918, all of which extend the scope of the Ottoman generation beyond its Arab members. Within the framework he sets out for himself, however, Provence is ultimately successful in challenging nationalist teleologies by illustrating the complexities of national origins, while raising important historiographical questions that will hopefully provoke some serious discussions well beyond the confines of the field of modern Middle Eastern Studies. Notes