The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (Making History)

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The Fischer controversy, documents, and the ‘truth’ about the Origins of the First World War (2013-04) Of War Plans and War Guilt: the Debate surrounding the Schlieffen Plan’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, 5, 2006, pp.857-885 Vom kurzen Krieg zum Ersten Weltkrieg: Der deutsche Kriegsverlauf im August und September 1914’, HISTORICUM, (Vienna) December 2001 In May 2019, she organised (with colleagues in the History Department) a Royal Historical Society Symposium entitled Contested Commemorations: Reflections on the centenary of the First World War, 2013-2019 , jointly funded by the Royal Historical Society and the Open University. https://royalhistsoc.org/rhs-symposium-ou-2019/ On the eve of the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War in 2014, the debate once again became heated as new revisionist publications sparked controversy. Having researched Germany’s decision making in and before 1914 for more than 20 years, I wanted to contribute to the conversation. Helmuth von Moltke, the overlooked architect of the war

The German Reich was not “guilty” of World War I. Such a category did not exist then, for, according to the code of European state wars, sovereign states had the “ ius ad bellum” as long as they could claim a violation of their interests. In 1914, this right to war applied least to Great Britain because the United Kingdom could not claim an immediate interest of coalition obligation for an intervention in a local war (between Austria-Hungary and Serbia). Only the British entry into the war turned the original conflict into a global disaster. Footnote 114 the long controversy around the question, why did the war break out in the first place? Over the next four weeks, some renowned historians will share their research and analysis with you. And you’ll discover the devastating impact of the war on individuals and on whole societies. While this might seem like a sobering learning experience, it’s also a moving story that’s lost none of its fascination more than a century after it began. John Keiger: Yes, I'm afraid that, rather pessimistically, I do think that, particularly over Ukraine, but also perhaps over what is going on in the Far East, [where] there is a potential for things to go horribly wrong. One incident in which the pride of a nation becomes implicated -- like, for instance, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 -- that kind of incident, if it came today, say, the assassination of a major person in Ukraine that immediately brought into play the various external powers, then that could provoke a very serious incident. That does concern me. I don't think the United Nations would be able to do very much. It is very hard to know, but, for instance, if the Russian ambassador in Ukraine was assassinated, what would happen?For the victors who assembled at the 1919 peace conference at the Palace of Versailles near Paris, the answer was clear: Germany and its allies were responsible for unleashing war in the summer of 1914. Yet, this so-called ‘war guilt ruling’, embodied by Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which obliged the losing side to pay vast reparations, did anything but settle the argument. Germany’, in Holger Herwig and Richard Hamilton (eds), War Planning 1914, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 48-79 Find out more about this book

Gerhard Hirschfeld: I don't see parallels. History does not repeat itself. History is, in a way, dependent on certain factors and conditions that are different from what we used to have. There are no parallels between 1914 and 2014. Having said that, there is one element, however, that, I'm afraid, creates continuity and this is the human factor. People do not change. They have the same feelings, emotions, ambitions, strivings for power. So, when it comes to judging the personal factor, the ambitions of politicians, there I would say is an element of continuity. But the historical context changed dramatically. We didn't have a NATO in 1914, we didn't have an OSCE, an EU. We didn't have international organizations and alliances that are controlling elements of a crisis. You have the same emotions, but not the same conditions and historical structures as in the past. She would be interested to hear from prospective PhD students wishing to research a topic in modern German or European history. Publications Monographs

According to Gerhard Hirschfeld and Gerd Krumeich, the German Reich had “maneuvered itself into a cul-de-sac from which it could not find a way out, but it certainly was not solely responsible for the escalation of the crisis.” Footnote 80 Whether or not Germany acted out of a sense of strength or weakness hardly mattered, in the end, for the outcome of the crisis. Its potential enemies were strengthening their military might, and there is certainly a good deal of evidence suggesting that Germany's leaders feared a time in the not-too-distant future when Russia would be too strong to defeat. Because of its geographic position (i.e., flanked by two hostile powers) and with no alternative to the only plan for deployment in the event of a two-front war, fear of an uncertain future outweighed the fear of a war that one believed one could somehow envision (leaving aside the fact that such visions ultimately fell far short of reality). In the summer of 1914, Germany's leaders were still confident in their momentary advantage over their adversaries: it is thus possible that they combined feelings of superiority with fear of their potential enemies, and that they were motivated by both in equal measure. Now we’ve talked a lot about guilt, responsibility, culpability, and that’s essentially what this long debate has always been about – trying to attribute guilt, starting of course in the war itself and then at Versailles, it was very much about war guilt for the obvious reasons of needing someone to shoulder the reparations and being responsible. But how useful do you think it is to talk about war guilt now that we’re a hundred years or more removed from these events – should historians attribute responsibility and guilt? By contrast, few historians argued, until recently, for British responsibility for the outbreak of war. Britain's foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, has traditionally been seen as one of the few decision-makers who honestly worked toward keeping the peace in July 1914. Footnote 24 In fact, most historians agreed that London was the only capital where decision-makers were reluctant to contemplate war. Distracted until the very end of the crisis by the Irish Question, a war on the continent was, for Britain, only a golden opportunity because it could diffuse the domestic crisis: it is no exaggeration to say that a civil war loomed over the Irish Question in the summer of 1914. Margot Asquith's recently published diary, for example, clearly shows the preoccupation with Ireland during the fateful weeks of the summer of 1914, an impression confirmed by other contemporary accounts. “All happened in such a short time,” the Prime Minister's wife recorded on August 4: “On 30 th July everyone was talking of Ireland. The cry of ‘Civil war! Civil war!’ to which The Times and the Tories treated us every day has been stilled in five days.” Footnote 25

From Imperial Army to Bundeswehr: continuity and change in the role of the military in German history’, Review Article, The Historical Journal, 47, 1 (2004), pp.1-7 Clark has greatly advanced our understanding of these crucial events by shifting our focus away from Central Europe to the Balkans, as well as from the immediate causes of the war in 1914 to 1903, thus moving the debate in new directions and highlighting how crucial these “Serbian Ghosts” are for understanding the Balkan origins of the war. Based on Clark's new approach, International Relations theorists have come to understand this brutal act of 1903 as the start of territorial or spatial rivalries between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (the two had maintained better relations before 1903 than they ever would again): “If one could find an initial origin of the war, separate from long-term structural forces, the 1903 murder was it,” political scientist John A. Vasquez argues. Footnote 34Clark's forceful intervention has made others question the validity of the century-long quest to find “the culprit” and pin blame primarily on one country—Germany. His resolutely international approach confirms the idea that the origins of the war can only be effectively studied by adopting a comparative international approach. The same is true of the war itself, of course. Jay Winter's ambitious Cambridge History of the First World War, as well as Oliver Janz's online project, “1914–1918 online,” are both exemplary specimens of this: both of these multi-authored publications approach the history of the war from an international viewpoint, focusing on both great and small powers, in Europe and around the world. They take care to give a voice to the histories (and the historians) of countries that may seem peripheral from a European perspective. The war thus emerges as a truly global phenomenon. Footnote 81

Der Moltke Plan. Modifikation des Schlieffenplans bei gleichen Zielen?’, in Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans and Gerhard P. Groß (eds), Der Schlieffenplan. Analyse und Dokumente, Paderborn, Schöningh 2006, pp.79-99 I also collated, translated and edited a collection of more than 400 international documents relevant to the origins of the war, many previously unpublished, which readers can use to discover for themselves the level of responsibility of each major power for the coming of the war. Challenging the popular rewriting of history The Origins of the First World War: diplomatic and military documents, Manchester University Press, 2013 Find out more about this book Here Annika explains her research and why it’s essential to understand the origins of the war and the controversy the topic has sparked. The hundred-year debate Julikrise und Kriegsschuldfrage – Thesen und Stand der Forschung', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Spring 2014

ANNIKA MOMBAUER: Welcome to World War 1– trauma, memory, controversy. I’m Annika and I’m your guide as we study the impact of the First World War. You will study and explore the trauma suffered by soldiers and civilians alike. This course will help you understand and contextualise the brutality of this war. And to empathise with those who suffered as a result of it. We will ask, what is remembered of this war? And explore its long-term consequences. How do the outcomes still affect us today? And why is there still a controversy about why it started? We begin our explorations by focusing on the physical and mental casualties of the war. Then we will explore how this war affected the lives of civilians. While this book provides the reader with a clear account of the shifting debates surrounding the origins of the war, it is a book infused with Fischer’s ideas (and the work of later academics in the Fischer mould such as John Röhl). This is the second level on which one can approach this book. The notion that Germany, in some measure, was responsible for the war provides a parallel pathway of study in The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus. The focus on Germany helps raises this study from an undergraduate text in which the author simply presents the different points of view. Mombauer has a point to prove. Unlike Langdon, who is happy to lay out the arguments, Mombauer has an argument. She argues that Fischer was basically right and German attempts to write her guilt out of the history books should be recognised for what they are. This approach gives the book a passionate feel that makes for a good read and provides a clear line of argument through the book , which leaves the reader with a knowledge not just of all the perspectives surrounding the war’s origins but also of the key role Germany plays in any understanding of why war erupted in August 1914. Providing an excellent entry point into the labyrinth of debates on the origins of the Great War, this book will surely become a core text for students looking for a platform from which they can delve further into this historiographical minefield. Notes All upcoming public events are going ahead as planned and you can find more information on our events blog